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LEGAL LIBERALISM AT YALE 
Stephen M. Grif[zn1 
THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM. 
By Laura Kalman. 2 New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Press. 1996. Pp. viii, 375. Cloth, $40.00. 
Laura Kalman's book appears at first to be history on a 
very small scale. She offers an account of the reaction of ten le-
gal scholars3 to the Supreme Court's conservative turn in the 
1970s and 1980s, as well to developments in constitutional the-
ory, such as the need to justify Roe v. Wade4 and the rise of 
originalism. Closer examination reveals that Kalman has writ-
ten the first history of contemporary constitutional theory, a his-
tory that will be of interest to anyone doing work in the field. 
More important, Kalman has provided the most detailed and 
sophisticated discussion to date of what can be called the prob-
lem of history in constitutional interpretation.5 
Kalman defines legal liberalism "as confidence in the ability 
of courts to change society for what judges believe is the bet-
1. Professor of Law, Tulane University. 
2. Professor of History, University of California, Santa Barbara. 
3. The ten scholars are Bruce Ackerman, Akhil Amar, Owen Fiss, Sanford Levin-
son, Frank Michelman, Suzanna Sherry, Cass Sunstein, Gregory Alexander, Morton 
Horwitz, and Mark Tushnet. 
Kalman's discussion is certainly not limited to these ten. Other scholars whose 
work is discussed to some degree include Raoul Berger, Alexander Bickel, Paul Brest, 
Robert Cover, Ronald Dworkin, John Hart Ely, Richard Epstein, Stanley Fish, Michael 
Klarman, William E. Nelson, Richard Posner, H. Jefferson Powell, David Rabban, and 
Laurence Tribe. The first names of Amar and Tribe are consistently misspelled 
throughout the book. 
4. 410 u.s. 113 (1973). 
5. My own discussion of this problem occurs in Stephen M. Griffin, American 
Constitutionalism: From Theory to Politics 164-69 (Princeton U. Press, 1996). 
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ter. "6 (p. 4) More specifically, legal liberalism means support 
for the Warren Court and a belief that its legacy deserves pro-
tection from (presumably) legal conservatives. Kalman con-
tends that protecting the legacy of the Warren Court became in-
creasingly problematic in the 1970s, leading to a crisis that law 
professors hoped to solve by turning to other academic disci-
plines-first to moral philosophy, then to hermeneutics, and fi-
nally to history. Kalman's ten scholars are all examples of this 
final turn to history, specifically the turn toward republicanism, 
that has received so much attention in the law reviews over the 
past decade. 
Kalman identifies herself as a legal liberal, and she has writ-
ten not simply a legal history, but a self-conscious defense of the 
use of history as a way to come to grips with the changes that 
have occurred in the Supreme Court's jurisprudence since the 
Warren Court. Kalman also identifies strongly with Yale, where 
she received her doctorate in history. She seems to have the 
deepest insight with respect to the constitutional scholars that 
have watched the Court from New Haven over the years, first 
discussing Alexander Bickel, then Owen Fiss and Robert Cover, 
and finally Bruce Ackerman and Akhil Amar. At times, the 
book threatens to become a history of constitutional theory at 
Yale.7 
Kalman's history of legal liberalism invites reflection not 
simply on the proper relation of history to constitutional law, 
but on the possible future of legal liberalism and the nature of 
constitutional theory. After summarizing Kalman's history, I 
will address each of these topics below. 
I 
In Part One, "The Spell of the Warren Court," Kalman 
provides an intellectual history of contemporary constitutional 
theory. She begins by tracing its origins in legal realism and the 
reaction of legal-process scholars such as Henry Hart to Brown 
v. Board of Education.8 According to Kalman, the legacy of le-
gal realism for constitutional theory was a concern with finding 
6. This is actually Kalman's definition of the belief of law professors in '"the cult 
of the Court,"' but it is equivalent to her definition of legal liberalism provided on page 
2 of the book. 
7. See Kalman's earlier book, Legal Realism at Yale 1927-1960 (U. of North 
Carolina Press, 1986). 
8. 347 u.s. 483 (1954). 
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objective foundations for constitutional reasoning. In general, 
however, she regards legal-process scholars such as Hart and 
Bickel as having far more influence than the legal realists over 
the subsequent course of constitutional theory. Like many 
scholars (including myself), she identifies Bickel's "counter-
majoritarian difficulty" as havinf set the agenda for constitu-
tional theory in the law schools. She tends to see subsequent 
developments in constitutional theory, including the turn to re-
publicanism, as efforts to answer Bickel's democratic critique of 
judicial review. 
The greatest impetus behind the development of contempo-
rary constitutional theory, however, was not Brown, but Roe. 
Roe was the return of substantive due process, thought discred-
ited in the Lochner era, and it set constitutional theorists to 
work in a way that Brown had not. The responses to Roe were 
interdisciplinary in a way that was new. Kalman describes the 
growing interest of law professors in other disciplines in the 
1970s, inspired partly by more conservative readings of the Con-
stitution by the Burger Court. The first turn was to moral phi-
losophy, specifically Rawls's theory of justice, but, as Kalman 
tells the story, legal scholars soon decided that Rawls's work did 
not have much direct relevance to constitutional law. 
More fruitful was Thomas Grey's introduction of the dis-
tinction between interpretivism and noninterpretivism. 10 Al-
though Grey explicitly endorsed a noninterpretivist justification 
of controversial Court decisions, the subsequent debate seemed 
to involve scholars trying to justify the same decisions while re-
maining resolutely interpretivist. The publication of Raoul 
Berger's critique of the Court's fourteenth amendment jurispru-
dence made this move much harder by in effect defining inter-
pretivism in terms of what came to be known as originalism. 11 
Despite the fact that the Burger Court did not overrule 
Warren Court rulings wholesale, Kalman sees legal liberalism as 
being under siege during the late 1970s, especially in the wake of 
the rise of law and economics and critical legal studies. Legal 
liberalism was also troubled during this period by splits within it 
9. My own analysis is set out in Stephen M. Griffin, What Is Constitutional The-
ory? The Newer Theory and the Decline of the Learned Tradition, 62 S. Cal. L. Rev. 493 
(1989). 
10. See Thomas C. Grey, Do We Ha~·e an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 Stan. L. Rev. 
703 (1975). 
11. See Raoul Berger, Government by Judiciary: The Transformation of the Four-
teenth Amendment (Harvard U. Press, 1977). 
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over important public policy issues such as affirmative action. 
As legal liberals became demoralized, they turned at the begin-
ning of the 1980s to other disciplines for reassurance with a 
sense of renewed effort. This time, the turn was to hermeneu-
tics. 
I suspect that most of us who diligently waded through the 
endless articles and symposia generated in the 1980s on the na-
ture of interpretation eventually reached the conclusion that 
Gadamer and company either did not lead anywhere or simply 
tracked long-established lines of reasoning in legal interpreta-
tion.12 At times it seemed that the main reason legal scholars 
were interested in hermeneutics was to have a handy way to re-
fute originalism. For example, Kalman describes Paul Brest's 
attempt to criticize originalism by using hermeneutic theory. 13 
But the use of complex European theories of interpretation 
probably only confirmed originalists in their belief that legal lib-
erals were noninterpretivists through and through. 
For Kalman, Owen Fiss exemplified legal liberalism in the 
1980s, first declaring that traditional approaches were dead, then 
gradually assuming a more hopeful outlook. Fiss's initial pessi-
mistic judgment was more the result of developments in legal 
theory generally, specifically the already mentioned challenges 
posed by law and economics and critical legal studies, than the 
outcome of debates in constitutional theory. Nonetheless, Kal-
man reaches the somewhat extreme conclusion that by the mid-
1980s, legal liberalism "appeared dead, a historical relic. Al-
most precisely at this point, history came to the rescue." (p. 
131) 
The turn to history worked in a way that the earlier turns to 
moral philosophy and hermeneutics did not. A school of 
thought, neorepublicanism, was created from the ideas of the 
founding generation. It was created in part to answer the con-
servative critics of mainstream constitutional theory, from At-
torney General Edwin Meese onward, who used originalism as a 
club to pillory legal liberalism. While legal liberals could re-
spond by criticizing originalism, they did not want to abandon 
the Framers to the tender mercies of the Reagan administration. 
12. See, e.g., Symposium, Constitutional Adjudication and Democratic Theory, 56 
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 259 (1981); Interpretation Symposium, 58 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1 (1985). 
13. See Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 
B.U. L. Rev. 204 (1980). 
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Properly understood, didn't history support the New Deal and 
the Warren Court? And so the turn to history began. 
At this point, Kalman provides some background on the 
republican revival, which is the main focus of the book. Legal 
scholars took inspiration from the histories of republicanism 
provided by Bernard Bailyn, Bailyn's student Gordon Wood, 
and J.G.A. Pocock. Kalman identifies Pocock as being of spe-
cial importance to legal liberals in search of a new approach be-
cause "Pocock was saying America possessed a home-grown and 
nonsocialistic alternative to the liberal tradition." {p. 153) Cass 
Sunstein and Frank Michelman were the legal liberals leading 
the way toward republicanism. Kalman says that "liberal law 
professors marketed republicanism as a theory that could solve 
the counter-majoritarian difficulty, revive Warren Court liber-
alism, provide progressives with even more than they had re-
ceived from the Warren Court, and had the Founders' imprima-
tur." (p. 160) But Kalman sounds a note of warning. "Once 
law professors made the historic turn, historians entered the fray 
to police their territory." (p. 163) 
While Kalman's account of the progress of contemporary 
constitutional theory is excellent in many respects, it is always 
difficult to write this kind of "present history. "14 Since the 
events Kalman discusses are still within living memory, I sup-
pose that some scholars would quibble over this or that aspect of 
her story. My particular quibble is that Kalman seems to think 
that Bickel's countermajoritarian difficulty dates back to the 
founding and that Bickel represented it as such. To the con-
trary, the countermajoritarian difficulty is largely a twentieth-
century creation. The difficulty had credibility for Bickel's 
readers because of the conflict between the New Deal and the 
Old Court, not because the founding generation also believed in 
majoritarian democratic principles and set those principles 
against judicial review. Bickel clearly relied on this twentieth-
century background in The Least Dangerous Branch, not the 
thought of the founding generation. 15 
In Part Two, "Lawyers and Historians," Kalman drops the 
chronological narrative of legal liberalism to provide an ex-
tended argument on the relationship between law and history. 
She wishes to argue that "historians inside and outside the law 
14. See Theodore Draper, Present History (Random House, 1983). 
15. See Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at 
the Bar of Politics (Bobbs-Merrill, 1962). 
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schools have something to say to academic lawyers, and that 
both lawyers and historians would benefit from the inter-
change." (p. 9) She also has a point to make against the many 
historians who criticize the use of history in legal scholarship: 
"historians should recognize that the historic turn represents a 
sensible strategy for legal liberals and ... law professors, who 
yearn for validation from the rest of the academy, should not 
curry favor with historians by abandoning the attempt to discern 
original meanings of the Constitution." (p. 9) 
Kalman begins her discussion by endorsing William E. Nel-
son's distinction between lawyers' legal history and historians' 
legal history. The idea is that lawyers' legal history is motivated 
by current legal controversies, whereas historians' legal history 
is not. Historians are thus interested in the past in a general 
sense, not simply as a way of solving the legal problems of the 
present. This distinction is not one between professions. Law 
professors are perfectly capable of writing historians' legal his-
tory and history professors are perfectly capable of writing his-
tory that serves a contemporary legal purpose. In addition, 
Kalman endorses Nelson's point that neither version of history 
is superior to the other. The past can be used in many ways for 
many different purposes. 
This approach to history in the law means that historians 
should not have been concerned with the use of history by the 
neorepublicans. As Kalman is at pains to explain, however, his-
torians most certainly were concerned, even offended, by the 
trespass of legal liberals into their territory. Historians such as 
Joyce Appleby criticized the appropriation of republicanism by 
law professors. These criticisms exposed fundamental differ-
ences between the approach of most history professors and the 
legal liberals. Kalman notes that historians "favor context, 
change, and explanation," while law professors "value text, con-
tinuity, and prescription." (p. 180) From the perspective of 
Appleby and other historians, legal history that is motivated by 
contemporary views such as legal liberalism will inevitably be 
presentist history, history that introduces too much orderliness 
and schematization into the study of the past. 
In her final chapter, Kalman notes that despite many criti-
cisms, originalism remains part of the constitutional scene and 
wonders whether historians and lawyers can reach some ac-
commodation. She urges historians to engage the work of law 
professors, even as they may view lawyers' legal history as more 
myth than history. Kalman argues boldly that this should not 
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matter. The history produced by legal liberals, whether origi-
nalist or not, is itself part of American history and should be re-
garded as an attempt to come to grips with the meaning of his-
torical change within our constitutional tradition. 
To show how historians can legitimately connect with con-
temporary issues, Kalman describes the field of public history 
and the effort by some historians to affect public policy. Histo-
rians have served as expert witnesses and have participated ac-
tively in the writing of amicus briefs in Supreme Court cases. 
She argues that this participation makes sense when competent 
historical investigation supports the public policy positions his-
torians want to advance. 
Even such well-meaning efforts pose problems. Lawyers 
want the past to provide continuity, whether they are interested 
in having the Court uphold past precedents (as in the case of 
abortion litigation during the 1980s) or overturn them. From a 
historical perspective, however, the focus should be on change in 
the past and how that change might support continuity or 
change in the present. Kalman remarks tellingly, "[f]or histori-
ans, the most satisfying constitutional theory might represent a 
combination of noninterpretivism with changed circumstances." 
(p. 201) Lawyers before the Court cannot rely on such a theory. 
In order to be persuasive, lawyers must look for continuities be-
tween past and present. Before the Court, original intent must 
be combated with original intent, not with an argument that 
original intent has been rendered anachronistic by historical 
change. 
Kalman nevertheless argues that historians can participate 
in court cases without losing their integrity as scholars. She 
draws a distinction between scholarly history and public history 
for nonacademics. Historians can legitimately offer public his-
tory if it is responsible. She illustrates her idea of responsibility 
by endorsing H. Jefferson Powell's "rules for originalists." 16 His-
torians can legitimately make originalist arguments in court to 
the extent they are responsible in this sense and also to the ex-
tent that they would argue for the same positions before a schol-
arly audience. The way the arguments are presented may differ, 
but as long as the historian is consistent in the conclusions she or 
he draws, scholarly integrity is preserved. 
16. See H. Jefferson Powell, Rules for Originalists, 73 Va. L. Rev. 659 (1987). 
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Kalman then moves back to neorepublicanism and asks 
whether it is good public history by the criteria she has devel-
oped. She notes that the neorepublicans are contesting with 
conservative originalists for control of the constitutional terrain, 
and that the political beliefs of most historians match the former 
much more than the latter. Kalman argues that historians 
should recognize that this conflict with originalists must be 
fought, not avoided with arguments about the historical unreal-
ity of originalism. After all, neorepublicans are advancing a ver-
sion of originalism as well. Kalman thinks it is possible for his-
tory professors to be critical of neorepublicanism in their role as 
historians, yet be favorably disposed to it as citizens who recog-
nize that by embracing a framework for politics endorsed by the 
Framers, they at least ensure a hearing for their point of view in 
American political debate. 
Ultimately, Kalman sees Bruce Ackerman's "neofederalist" 
theory of dualist democracy as having a better chance than neo-
republicanism of reconciling the differing approaches toward 
history taken by lawyers and historians. Kalman notes that 
Ackerman's work has been received far more favorably by his-
torians than by legal scholars. Kalman thinks that Ackerman 
has more historical support for his theory than law professors 
have acknowledged. She argues that Ackerman's theory "is 
more historically plausible than neorepublicanism and that it 
possesses the potential to move constitutional theory beyond the 
counter-majoritarian difficulty." (p. 221) Kalman answers 
scholars like Laurence Tribe who are critical of the projects of 
both Ackerman and Amar that this '"Yale school"' of constitu-
tional interpretation shows a "greater sensitivity to history and a 
more disciplined approach to interdisciplinary work." (p. 224) 
(emphasis in original) From Kalman's point of view, the Yale 
school promises to use history to replace Bickel's myth of the 
countermajoritarian difficulty with a new historical-legal myth 
of the founding-one that emphasizes the sovereignty of the 
people "and, by explaining how constitutional change has oc-
curred, to illuminate how it may take place." (pp. 224-25) 
Kalman says that she does not advocate Ackerman's brand 
of neofederalism and cites various problems with it. But she 
admires the work of Ackerman and Amar as a creative use of 
history to get constitutional theory out of its countermajoritar-
ian rut. Even if constitutional theory escapes its obsession with 
judicial power and countermajoritarianism, however, it will not 
be out of the woods. The faith of legal liberals in the promise of 
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court cases such as Brown and in the Court as an engine of so-
cial change has been undermined. Brown is now attacked both 
by critical race theorists and conservatives such as Justice 
Clarence Thomas. Kalman refers to Michael Klarman's back-
lash thesis, which argues that Brown caused social change only 
indirectly, by inspiring a virulent white backlash that led eventu-
ally to violent confrontations that crystallized a national major-
ity in favor of civil rights. 17 So constitutional theorists have 
moved from seeing Brown as prophetic to seeing it merely as the 
indirect cause of a great change that was not the Court's to gen-
erate in the first place. With regard to Klarman and his genera-
tion of theorists (of which I am a member), Kalman asks: "[i]f 
1937, 1954, and 1973 were the pivotal moments for the last three 
generations of constitutional law professors-the Wechslers, the 
Covers and Michelmans, the Sunsteins-what will be the deci-
sive moment for members of this new generation?" (pp. 234-35) 
Kalman fears the loss of the understanding of Brown as a 
pivotal case and the loss of faith in judicial power. Klarman's 
process theory that avoids legal liberalism and drains Brown of 
its significance, says Kalman, "frightens me, as it must legal lib-
erals at law schools who see Brown as foundational and derive a 
sense of purpose from it." (p. 235) She sees neorepublicanism 
and neofederalism as better alternatives in that they seek to use 
history to come to grips with the present and revitalize the proj-
ect of "legitimating judicial review by a liberal judiciary." (p. 
235) Kalman does worry that if constitutional theory loses its 
focus on the countermajoritarian difficulty, it may justify activ-
ism by a conservative Court. But she takes comfort in the 
thought that "if the wheel turns and an activist liberal Court 
committed to making law a tool of social reform emerges, it 
would probably be able to work more effectively if it is not dog-
ged by the counter-majoritarian bogeyman." (pp. 236-37) 
II 
Kalman's reflections on the relation between history and 
constitutional. theory, the nature of scholarship, and the future 
of legal liberalism raise many interesting and important ques-
tions. While the use of history in constitutional scholarship has 
been very problematic, historians have not often been willing to 
lend their assistance in exploring better ways to make use of the 
17. See Michael J. Klarman. Brown v. Board of Education: Facts and Political Cor-
rectness, 80 Va. L. Rev. 185 (1994). 
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past. Kalman's discussion of the uses of history is by far the 
most extensive to date. 18 It is helpful both in understanding the 
problems legal scholars face in trying to find a usable past and 
the much different perspective historians bring to constitutional 
debates. Although I provide a number of criticisms below, any 
future discussion of these questions must take Kalman's book 
into consideration. 
Kalman's project is one of reconciliation. Lawyers are to 
be reconciled with historians and originalists are to be recon-
ciled with nonoriginalists. Unfortunately, there are good rea-
sons for thinking that the opposing parties are not interested in 
mediation. One way to see this is to ask whether originalists 
would accept the historical methodology that Kalman recom-
mends. It is likely that they would not. 
Consider Kalman's use of Powell's "rules for originalists. "19 
For Kalman, Powell's rules on how to use history are a matter of 
common sense. They should be adopted by anyone seeking to 
"use history for originalist purposes." (p. 202) The flavor of 
Powell's rules can be conveyed by three examples: "History it-
self will not prove anything nonhistorical"; "History answers-
and declines to answer-its own issues, rather than the concerns 
of the interpreter"; and "History never obviates the necessity of 
choice. "20 While these rules may make sense to historians, any 
self-respecting originalist would have to reject them. Indeed, 
part of the point of Powell's article is that originalists do not, in 
fact, accept these rules. 21 While Powell criticizes originalists for 
ignoring the rules of good history, Kalman expects them to 
smoothly adopt the rules without complaint. Both Powell and 
Kalman fail to appreciate that the price of adopting the rules 
would be the end of originalism, at least as contemporary origi-
nalists understand it. 
Originalism as practiced by Robert Bork, Henry Monaghan 
and others is not simply an appeal to history, but a complex con-
stitutional theory that is variously based on appeals to the need 
to curb judicial discretion, to the constrained role of a judiciary 
18. For other recent discussions, see Griffin, American Constitutionalism (cited in 
note 5); Martin S. Flaherty, History "Lite" in Modern American Constitutionalism, 95 
Colum. L. Rev. 523 (1995); Cass R. Sinstein, The Idea of a Useable Past, 95 Colum. L. 
Rev. 601 (1995); Mark Tushnet, Interdisciplinary Legal Scholarhsip: The Case of His-
tory-in-Law, 71 Chi-Kent L. Rev. 909 (1996). 
19. See Powell, 73 Va. L. Rev. (cited in note 16). 
20. Id. at 662, 669, 691. 
21. See generally id. 
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in a democracy, and a critique of past Court decisions. 22 With 
respect to Powell's rules just quoted, it could be said that the 
purposes of originalism are to let history determine case out-
comes, show that history usually answers the concerns of con-
temporary constitutional interpreters, and let history reduce or 
even eliminate the problems of choice that justices face. Of 
course, none of these purposes is compatible with Powell's rules 
or Kalman's desire to reconcile originalism with nonoriginalism. 
In saying this, I do not mean to question Kalman's sugges-
tion that history written according to Powell's rules will occa-
sionally be helpful to lawyers and judges seeking guidance in 
constitutional cases. But Kalman is underestimating the gap be-
tween lawyers' and historians' legal history and also between 
those legal histories and the kind of appeals to history that have 
been common in originalist theory and in contemporary consti-
tutional theory in general. Kalman seems to think that original-
ism is an instance of lawyers' legal history. As just explained, it 
is something quite different-a particular constitutional theory 
or philosophy in which the appeal to history is just one impor-
tant element. 
The implausibility of Kalman's proposed reconciliation be-
tween historians' legal history and originalism points toward a 
larger difficulty-whether originalist or not, constitutional 
scholars are not interested in history in the way historians are. 
There is a deep incompatibility between the projects of the 
American constitutionalist and the American historian. One 
reason is that American constitutional law implicitly embodies a 
presentist bias, what historians call a Whig theory of history. As 
Joyce Appleby remarks, "[l]ike the history of science, the his-
tory of the United States Constitution has been largely written 
as the history of its progress."23 The story of constitutional law is 
typically presented as a narrative of moral progress, of a con-
tinuous closer approximation of the ideals of the founding gen-
eration, culminating in the desirable democratic order of the 
present, with its valuable and historically rooted set of funda-
mental rights. This story stresses the continuities between past 
22. See generally Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America: The Political Seduc-
tion of the Law (Free Press, 1990); Henry P. Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 353 (1981). 
~3. Joyce Appleby, The American Heritage: The Heirs and the Disinherited, in 
Dav1d Thelen, ed., The Constitution and American Life 146 (Cornell U. Press, 1988). 
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and present, rather than the discontinuities that have also con-
tributed to the present constitutional order.24 
Whether constitutional scholars are originalist or not or in 
favor of judicial activism or not, they are united in showing the 
American constitutional tradition in its best light and demon-
strating that the continuous development of this tradition argues 
in favor of whatever position they happen to hold.25 Since they 
argue from a text that has not changed much in a formal sense in 
over two hundred years, interpretations that stress a continuous 
commitment to the rule of law are far more useful to constitu-
tional lawyering than historicist narratives that stress conflict 
and change. 
Kalman knows all this in a sense. She reminds us many 
times that there are important differences in the worldviews of 
law professors and historians. Yet she has not gauged the full 
extent of the difference and she too easily accepts the responses 
of constitutional scholars to criticism of their work by historians. 
When historians criticized the work of the neorepublicans at a 
meeting of the Association of American Law Schools, Kalman 
quotes Frank Michelman's response that constitutional scholars 
must seek a usable past. Michelman asked, "'[w]ithout the 
past ... who am I?' ... 'Who are we? ... Without a sense of our 
identity, how do we begin to make a case for anything? Without 
mining the past, where do we go for inspiration?"' (p. 175) 
(emphasis in original) Kalman comments correctly that "[b]y 
mooring their vision in the Founding, law professors believed 
they could make a more powerful case for it." (p. 175) 
The ideas about the role of history expressed by Michelman 
are unexceptionable in legal scholarship. The past is understood 
as a source of identity, authority, and inspiration. Since not eve-
rything in American history is equally useful for such purposes, 
however, the past must be edited in light of contemporary val-
ues. This helps generate the mighty engine of Whig constitu-
tionalist history, which highlights very particular episodes in 
American history at the expense of others. The plausibility of 
Michelman's defense is weakened considerably if it is kept in 
mind that the neorepublicans (along with most constitutional 
scholars) were only really interested in one period in American 
24. See Gordon S. Wood, The Fundamentalists and the Constitution, The New 
York Review of Books, 33,39-40 (February 18, 1988). 
25. See Louis Michael Seidman and Mark V. Tushnet, Remnants of Belief" Con· 
temporary Constitutional Issues (Oxford U. Press, 1996). 
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history-the Founding. From a historicist point of view, we are 
indeed products of the past, but the entire American past is at 
least potentially relevant to who we are today. Understanding 
American constitutionalism historically means situating it within 
the flow of American history and particularly within the context 
of American political development. While this perspective may 
be familiar to historians and political scientists, especially those 
who stress the importance of institutions, it is a perspective en-
tirely unknown to the mainstream of legal scholarship. 
In its selectivity, the kind of "lawyers' legal history" prac-
ticed by originalists, neorepublicans, and by most constitutional 
scholars, is more akin to the history told by Hollywood than a 
careful attempt to come to terms with the past.26 The great mo-
ments of American constitutional history are told time and 
again, with particular emphasis on the great drama of the 
Founding, followed by a series of quick cuts reviewing the Civil 
War, Reconstruction, the Dark Age of the Lochner era, the New 
Deal, the civil rights movement, and the Warren Court. Here 
the story ends and theory begins. 
What is missing from this film? Only most of American 
political, social, economic, cultural, and intellectual history, 
much of which is essential context for any proper account of 
American constitutionalism. Contemporary American constitu-
tional history ends, after all, not with Chief Justice Warren but 
with Chief Justice Rehnquist. Understanding the terrain of con-
temporary constitutional politics means coming to grips with, 
among other things, the revival of conservatism in the 1980s that 
began in many ways with the defeat of Barry Goldwater in 1964. 
From the standpoint of Kalman's legal liberals, the 1980s 
was the decade of the revival of legal liberalism and the birth of 
neorepublicanism, a decade in which Robert Bork was banished 
from the "mainstream" of constitutional thought. Meanwhile, 
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Sandra Day O'Connor, 
Antonin Scalia, Anthony Kennedy, and Clarence Thomas began 
patiently moving the bed of the mainstream to the right. The 
selectivity of lawyers' legal history meant that legal liberals were 
poorly prepared for the new conservative age.27 The "revival" of 
26. On the difference between Hollywood history and historians' history, see gen-
erally Mark C. Carnes, ed., Past Imperfect: History According to the Movies (Henry 
Holt, 1995). 
27. For an illustrative argument on the limits of litigation in favor of legal liberal 
causes in this new conservative age, see Mark A. Graber, Rethinking Abortion: Equal 
Choice, the Constitution, and Reproductive Politics 118-56 (Princeton U. Press, 1996). 
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legal liberalism only marginalized constitutional theory. The 
Court refused to follow the script. 
If neorepublicans had been required to confront the whole 
of American history, they would have had to come to grips with 
some difficult questions. Where did American liberalism, the 
liberalism of the free market and the less government the better, 
come from? What was the relation of the ideals of the founding 
generation to the institution of slavery and the persistence of 
white supremacy? To what extent was the backlash against the 
Warren Court rooted in previous developments in American 
history, and what was the relationship between that backlash 
and the development of the conservative constitutional juris-
prudence that came to the fore in the 1980s and 1990s? An-
swering such questions would have put the neorepublicans in a 
better position to deal with a more conservative Court. On the 
other hand, answering such questions might have made neore-
publicanism appear less plausible. Either way, the result would 
have been a more realistic and less tendentious form of scholar-
ship. 
I do not mean to suggest that the neorepublicans are some-
how unique in relying on selective lawyers' legal history. The 
problem is general and it affects most constitutional law scholar-
ship. Kalman means to defend law professors from historians, 
but her account also supports the view that there is little that is 
scholarly about the way most law professors use history. Kal-
man's study supports the idea that there are important differ-
ences between the goals of lawyering and the goals of scholar-
ship. Law professors presumably learned something about how 
to be lawyers in law school, but no law school has a required 
course on legal scholarship. 
The distinction between lawyers' legal history and histori-
ans' legal history thus lets legal scholars off the hook too easily. 
The past can be read in many ways for many different purposes, 
but the recent history of legal liberalism demonstrates the 
problem with the argument of Kalman and others that if a 
reading is "useful" for the author and audience, then it should 
be respected and regarded as sound scholarship. Good scholar-
ship requires maintaining a critical perspective on one's own as-
sumptions, a perspective that encourages a search for objections 
and contrary evidence. By concentrating almost exclusively on 
the Founding and ignoring the importance of the rest of Ameri-
can history, Kalman's legal liberals and their originalist oppo-
nents made history a convenient handmaiden to their purposes, 
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rather than understanding that it is also a source of arguments 
and evidence against their most deeply cherished beliefs. Schol-
ars should at least be willing to keep all of this in view. 
III 
Kalman writes as if legal liberalism is still a live option. 
While there is little doubt that there are many who keep the 
faith as established by the Warren Court, the question is 
whether legal liberalism is a still a viable form of constitutional 
politics. Kalman observes accurately that legal liberals turned 
to history and neorepublicanism "in order to justify activism by 
a liberal Court ... " (p. 240) She does not go on to note that the 
prospect of a liberal Court seems to have disappeared. This 
omission is surprising for a historian. Kalman seems to have 
missed a change in context. 
Consider the recent work of Cass Sunstein, one of Kalman's 
ten neorepublican scholars. Unlike Kalman, Sunstein is quite 
comfortable declaring that "[t]he discussion generated by the 
Warren Court and its successor is over. The terms of the earlier 
debates are increasingly anachronistic."28 The new conservative 
jurisprudence and the decline of the Supreme Court as an insti-
tutional leader in American politics has changed the terrain of 
constitutional politics in ways that cannot be captured through 
an exploration of legal liberalism. 
For Kalman, legal liberalism is linked inextricably with the 
Warren Court. For legal liberalism to continue, the legacy of 
the Warren Court must still have meaning. As noted earlier, she 
asks somewhat plaintively what will be the case that will serve as 
a reference point for my generation of constitutional scholars, 
just as Brown served as a reference point for the legal liberals. 
The possible answers to this question are none too appealins. 
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services? 9 
City of Richmond v. Croson?30 Miller v. Johnson? 3' United 
States v. Lopez?32 More hap~ily for legal liberals, perhaps, 
Planned Parenthood v. Casey? 3 Romer v. Evans?34 Inspira-
28. Cass R. Sunstein, The Partial Constitution 1 (Harvard U. Press, 1 993). 
29. 489 U.S. 189 (1989). 
30. 488 U.S. 469 (1989). 
31. 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995). 
32. 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995). 
33. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
34. 116 s. Ct. 1620 (1996). 
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tional cases seem to be in short supply. On the other hand, one 
or more of these cases might well serve as a reference point for 
legal conservatives, but this of course is no help to Kalman. 
Kalman's discussion of legal liberalism seems to exist in a 
time warp. She places Brown on a pedestal, but time and cir-
cumstances have passed Brown by. Does it stand for the effec-
tive de jure desegregation of the nation's schools? Such deseg-
regation in terms of the formal abandonment of dual school 
systems has been achieved. Does it stand for the effective inte-
gration of public schools? Such integration will never be 
achieved. Owen Fiss, one of Kalman's leading legal liberals, re-
cently stated that '"[w]e're basically at a point where school de-
segregation efforts have collapsed, and Brown has been emptied 
of all its practical meaning, becoming just a symbol. "'35 
One of the more revealing aspects of the Clinton presidency 
has been the demonstration of the tenuous relationship between 
legal liberalism and the Democratic party. The Clinton admini-
stration has resolutely avoided spending political capital on judi-
cial appointments and constitutional controversies. The Reagan 
administration appointed leading legal conservatives to the 
bench; the Clinton administration has not responded in kind.36 
The Clinton administration opposed efforts to have the Su-
preme Court recognize a right to die.37 As the New Republic re-
cently summarized, "[t]he president's nominees [to the federal 
bench] are moderate and unobjectionable. The terms of debate 
on the courts have shifted, and the Republicans have won. "38 
While the failure of the Clinton administration to advance the 
cause of legal liberalism has disappointed various liberal groups, 
it has not cost the administration any significant political sup-
port. The administration's changes in welfare policy, for exam-
ple, are far more controversial in the Democratic party than its 
failure to support legal liberalism. 
If the first Democratic president to win a second term since 
Franklin Roosevelt cannot produce a revival of legal liberalism, 
35. Quoted in Jonathan Rabinovitz, School Choice is Proposed as Counter to Seg-
regation, N.Y. Times, 86 (January 24, 1997). 
36. See Neil A. Lewis,/n Selecting Federal Judges, Clinton Has Not Tried to Revere 
Republicans, N.Y. Times, A20 (August 1, 1996); Neil A. Lewis, Impeach Those Liberal 
Judges! Where Are They?, N.Y. Times, sec. 4 at 5 (May 18, 1997). 
37. For a more extensive list of the right of center positions taken by the Clinton 
administration on various civil rights-civil liberties issues, see Jeffrey Toobin, Clinton's 
Left-Hand Man, The New Yorker 28 (July 21, 1997). 
38. Obstruction of Justice, The New Republic, 9 (May 19, 1997). 
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a revival in the foreseeable future is extremely unlikely. It now 
appears to many observers that the Warren Court was an anom-
aly in American constitutionalism, a fortuitous combination of 
personalities and circumstances that could not last and will not 
be repeated. 
How did Kalman miss this change in context? One clue 
may lie in Kalman's failure to discuss the role of the idea of con-
sensus in contemporary constitutional theory. A reliance on 
some form of societal consensus on values has played a crucial 
role in many of the most important contemporary theories of 
American constitutionalism, including neorepublicanism.39 But 
the development of an increasingly open and politicized conflict 
over the role of the judiciary in American politics during the 
Bork nomination and after has made the idea of consensus seem 
problematic at best. 
Kalman's failure to discuss the idea of consensus is all the 
more puzzling given her endorsement of James Patterson's re-
cently published history of America from 1945-1974.40 One 
prominent theme in Patterson's book is the breakdown of politi-
cal consensus over a variety of issues in the 1960s.41 The break-
down of political consensus of course affected liberalism in gen-
eral and legal liberalism in particular. The advent of the Reagan 
administration should have made clear that significant opposi-
tion to the legacy of the Warren Court is a permanent feature of 
American constitutional politics. Since legal liberalism depends 
on the idea of consensus, the end of consensus in matters of ju-
dicial politics meant the end of legal liberalism. 
It may seem curious that legal liberalism should end with 
the rise of legal conservatism-doesn't legal liberalism imply its 
opposite? One key feature of legal liberalism that Kalman's 
book does not help us understand is its reliance on a politics of 
consensus and an appeal to an idealized set of public values pre-
sumed held by all citizens.42 The constitutional politics of the 
39. See, e.g., Bickel, Least Dangerous Branch (cited in note 15); Harry H. Welling-
ton, Interpreting the Constitution: The Supreme Court and the Process of Adjudication 
(Yale U. Press, 1990); Brest, 60 B.U. L. Rev. at 226-27 (cited in note 13); Owen M. Fiss, 
Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1979). For an influential critique of 
the idea of consensus, see John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial 
Review 63-69 (Harvard U. Press, 1980). 
40. See James T. Patterson, Grand Expectations: The United States, I945-I974 
(Oxford U. Press, 1996). Kalman's endorsement appears on the back of the jacket 
cover. 
41. See id. at 442-57,547-57,565-68,637-77,706-09,730-35. 
42. See Wellington, Interpreting the Constitution at 83-84 (cited in note 39). 
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1990s is not, it is safe to say, conducive to a politics of consensus. 
It is a politics, after all, in which Republicans in Congress have 
continued their assault on the "liberal judiciary," despite the fact 
that the federal bench is dominated by Reagan-Bush appointees. 
It is ironic that this politicization of the judiciary was set in mo-
tion by the Warren Court's legal liberalism, a liberalism that as-
sumed that all Americans of good will agreed on certain funda-
mental values. 
With regard to the issue of abortion, for example, Mark 
Graber has recently argued that "[w]hen political activists rec-
ognize, however grudgingly, that principled justices can, on re-
flection, disagree over whether abortion rights are protected by 
the Constitution, the case for using liti~ation as the sole means 
for securing legal abortion collapses. "4 The logic of Graber's 
argument applies with equal force to all of the issues introduced 
into American politics by the Warren Court. Once it became 
apparent that there was no consensus with respect to these is-
sues, that citizens of good will could disagree over these matters 
of principle, then the raison d'etre of legal liberalism disap-
peared. In the absence of consensus, any litigation campaign to 
secure one of these contested values would of course be opposed 
by counter-litigation. A campaign to secure these values 
through liberal judicial appointments would be opposed by ef-
forts to appoint judicial conservatives. In the 1980s and 1990s, 
constitutional politics caught up with the politicization and dis-
sensus characteristic of the rest of the American politics since 
the 1960s. Whether based on hermeneutics, neorepublicanism, 
or neofederalism, legal liberalism could not survive such a poli-
tics. 
Kalman's failure to confront the idea of consensus means 
that she cannot give any reason why the newer forms of legal 
liberalism (such as Ackerman's neofederalism) will in fact re-
store it as a viable form of constitutional politics. Neofederalism 
may be a theoretical and scholarly advance, as Kalman argues, 
but that does not have any implications for the real world of 
constitutional politics in the 1990s. If the younger generation of 
constitutional scholars is to find a source of inspiration, it will 
have to come from someplace other than the Court. 
43. Graber, Rethinking Abortion at 131 (cited in note 27). 
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IV 
Kalman's book invites reflection not just on legal liberal-
ism, but on the state of constitutional scholarship in general and 
constitutional theory in particular. By and large, Kalman is 
comfortable with the current state of scholarship. She is pleased 
that there is at least one group in the academy who are "at the 
barricades" ready to engage the forces of reaction. 44 If the 
scholarship that results lacks some of the sophistication of other 
work in the humanities and social sciences, Kalman is not overly 
concerned. It is a reasonable price to pay given that legal schol-
ars can do what other academics cannot: represent clients, file 
briefs, and win cases establishing important precedents. 
The problem here is that Kalman's book concerns a very 
particular kind of legal scholarship- theoretical scholarship 
concerned with American constitutionalism. There is reason to 
think that such scholarship should share at least some of the vir-
tues of other academic scholarship. The chief virtue I have in 
mind is critical distance-a quality that is often mentioned as a 
necessary component of any kind of reputable scholarship. As I 
noted earlier, being a scholar means being willing to question 
your own assumptions as well as commonly held beliefs. It im-
plies an attitude of skepticism and a willingness to search for 
contrary evidence. 
These qualities have been in short supply in contemporary 
constitutional theory. The countermajoritarian difficulty, which 
Kalman uses as a focus for her analysis, is a case in point. Ar-
guments about the countermajoritarian character of the Su-
preme Court are not purely normative. They also have a neces-
sary element of description or explanation concerning how the 
American political system works. In general, however, law pro-
fessors have not been willing to engage with relevant research 
from political scientists and historians that deals with the struc-
ture of the American political system and how that system has 
changed over time. Without such engagement, analysis by law 
professors of the place of the Court in American government 
will remain a matter of armchair generalizations and folk wis-
dom.45 
44. See Laura Kalman, Garbage-Mouth, 21 Law & Soc. Inquiry 1001,1005 (1996). 
45. See the discussion in John Henry Schlegel, Talkin' Dirty: Twining's Tower and 
Kalman's Strange Career, 21 Law & Soc. Inquiry 981,997-98 (1996). 
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The relentless emphasis on normative argument typical of 
contemporary constitutional theory thus has significant costs. It 
tends to marginalize constitutional theory in scholarly debate, 
since legal scholars use descriptive-explanatory models that 
seem quaint by the standards of other disciplines. Moreover, in 
the absence of political consensus, the normative arguments 
have lost much of their persuasive force. Law professors often 
try to write like ideal judges: with due respect for the arguments 
of both sides and a sense of balance and restraint. In the super-
heated atmosphere produced by the constitutional politics of the 
1990s, this approach is obsolete. Without the foundation pro-
vided by a truly scholarly orientation, the result at best is judi-
cious editorializing.46 
What would constitutional theory look like if it attempted 
to embrace the virtues of scholarship and reject standards of ar-
gument drawn from lawyering? In the first place, it would have 
to apply some critical distance to its own subject matter and 
consider the idea that the Court should not be at the center of 
constitutional theory. A more likely candidate for the subject 
matter of constitutional theory is the concept of constitutional-
ism and the study of the relationship between constitutional 
structures and the rest of the political system.47 Second, as just 
suggested, constitutional scholars would have to take on the task 
of devising descriptive-explanatory theories of American consti-
tutionalism that match the sophistication of their normative 
theories. Third, scholars would have to reject the idea that any 
particular normative project (such as legal liberalism) should be 
the raison d'etre of constitutional theory. Kalman to the con-
trary, the chief purpose of constitutional theory is not to man 
the barricades, but to understand what is going on. 
We will know that constitutional theory has become a truly 
scholarly enterprise when theorists stop caring quite so much 
about what the Supreme Court is doing and start caring more 
about what is going on in the rest of the constitutional system. 
When that happens, we might just get a theoretical enterprise 
that can help produce a viable form of constitutional politics. It 
46. See the discussion in Seidman and Tushnet, Remnants of Belief (cited in note 
25). 
47. See Griffin, American Constitutionalism at 3-4 (cited in note 5). 
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is unlikely that this new form of constitutional politics will re-
semble legal liberalism, if only because the day of the Warren 
Court is past. One can hope that it will be more responsive to 
the problems of its time than the warmed-over legal liberalism 
and the strident legal conservatism that appear to be the only 
options at present. 
